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OUT-OF-STATE TRASH: SOLID WASTE
AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE
BRADFORD C. MANK*
I. INTRODUCTION
America faces a garbage crisis. Many cities and states are rapidly
depleting their landfill capacity for ordinary municipal solid waste.'
The "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syndrome hinders regional
and national solutions to the solid waste problem.2 This Article exam-
ines to what extent local communities may exclude solid waste from
out-of-state sources without violating the Commerce Clause.
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,3 the United States Supreme Court
held that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state or local gov-
ernment from refusing to import most or all solid waste originating
outside that state. The New Jersey statute in question regulated both
* B.A., Harvard, 1983; J.D., Yale, 1987; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Connecticut. Any views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not
be attributed to the Connecticut Attorney General's Office.
1. See, ag., Beck, Buried Alive, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 1989, at 67; Kovacs and
Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services - Fair Competi-
tion or the Destruction of the Private Sector, 18 ENVTL. L. 779, 779-82 (1988); Com-
ment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Pastindustrial Natural Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309,
1309-11 (1989) (many communities are running out of space for solid waste).
2. See, eg., Beck, supra note 1, at 67; Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 781
(NIMBY frustrates efforts to build new landfills). But see Comment, supra note 1, at
1334 (local political participation prevents domination of landfill decisions by large
waste producers and handlers).
3. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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private and public landfills.4 The Supreme Court left open the issue of
whether a state may "restrict to state residents access to state-owned
resources... or... spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents
and businesses."' In other words, the Supreme Court did not address
to what extent state, county or municipal landfills may prohibit or dis-
criminate against out-of-state solid waste. Because states and local
governments own or operate approximately eighty-one percent of the
nation's landfills, Philadelphia v. New Jersey settled very little as a prac-
tical matter.6
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
five federal and state decisions have held that state, county or munici-
pal landfills may discriminate against or even prohibit out-of-state solid
waste without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.7 These cases
have all relied upon the principle that a state or local government may
discriminate against interstate commerce if the government is acting as
a "market participant" rather than as a "market regulator."8
These five decisions have sparked criticism. In the Third Circuit
case of Swin Resources Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pennsylvania,
Chief Judge Gibbons, dissenting, argued that the distinction between a
state's role as market participant and as a market regulator was no
longer valid, and contended that the dormant Commerce Clause bar
states or local governments from discriminating against the importa-
tion of out-of-state solid waste.9 In addition, two authorities, Kovacs
and Anderson, claim that states attempt to evade the Commerce
Clause by using their regulatory powers to drive out private landfill
operators, who may not discriminate against out-of-state solid waste,
ensuring governmental monopoly control of landfills in order to block
the importation of out-of-state solid waste.10
This Article argues that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits
4. Id. at 618-19.
5. Id. at 627 n.6.
6. Comment, supra note 1, at 1311 and n.18 (81% of landfills are owned by local
and state governments) (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 33,318 (1988)).
7. Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989); Lefrancois
v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropoli-
tan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D.Or. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1482
(9th Cir. 1987); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C.
1984); County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 473 A.2d 12 (1984).
8. See cases cited supra note 7.
9. 883 F.2d 245, 257-62 (3d Cir. 1989).
10. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810.
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state or local government landfills from discriminating against out-of-
state solid waste, but provides a different analysis than Judge Gibbons
or Kovacs and Anderson. Although Judge Gibbons and Kovacs and
Anderson make a number of valid points, the Supreme Court is un-
likely to adopt the arguments of either.
Courts have created a "natural resources" exception to the market
participant doctrine to prevent states from using their ownership of
scarce natural resources to burden interstate commerce.1" The five
courts that have allowed state or local landfills to discriminate against
out-of-state solid waste viewed landfills as service industries rather
than natural resources.12 This Article contends that landfills are a hy-
brid or a mixture of natural resources, primarily land, and services.
Consequently, courts should weigh the national importance to inter-
state commerce of a "mixed" natural resource/service in determining
whether to apply the market participant doctrine.
In addition, courts that have permitted landfills to discriminate
against out-of-state solid waste often emphasize local storage of landfill
space. 3 This Article argues that courts should not consider these "ar-
tificial" shortages created by NIMBY politics. By vigorously enforcing
the dormant Commerce Clause, courts can encourage regional or na-
tional solutions to the solid waste crisis.
II. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
It will be useful to explore the general principles underlying the dor-
mant Commerce Clause before examining the specific issues relating to
solid waste. In particular, one needs to understand the "market par-
ticipant" doctrine and its "natural resources" exception.
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution serves a
dual function. By its express terms, it provides: "The Congress shall
have power . . . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.... "14 The Supreme Court has interpreted
the Commerce Clause "not only as an authorization for congressional
action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, as a
11. See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
1990]
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restriction on permissible state regulation." 15 Courts refer to this latter
role of negative restrictions as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. 16
Dormant Commerce Clause limitations apply with equal force to all
laws and regulations that affect interstate commerce, whether at the
state, county or municipal level.17
The Supreme Court has construed the dormant Commerce Clause as
a check on state and local authority that prevents the "rivalries and
reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce be-
tween the states to the power of the nation."' 8 The dormant Com-
merce Clause is designed to promote the "material success that has
come to inhabitants of the states which make up this federal free trade
unit."19 The Supreme Court has declared:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the
certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Na-
tion, that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no
foreign state will by custom duties or regulations exclude them.
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from
every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exPloita-
tion from any. Such was the vision of the Founders....
The Supreme Court has developed a two-part dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. Non-discriminatory laws and regulations that burden
the flow of interstate commerce must satisfy a balancing test: "Where
the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.",
21
By contrast, the Court has held per se unconstitutional those state
statutes and regulations that foster economic isolation of the state by
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (footnote omitted).
16. Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d at 248; Lefrancois v. Rhode
Island, 669 F. Supp. at 1207; Comment, supra note 1, at 1313-17 (discussing the basic
nature of the "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause).
17. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960); County
Comm'rs v. Stevens, 299 Md. at 208, 473 A.2d at 14 (courts applied Commerce Clause
analysis to county resolutions and municipal ordinances).
18. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935).
19. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
20. Id. at 539.
21. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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discriminating against interstate commerce in favor of local interests.22
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court applied the per se
unconstitutional standard applied to a New Jersey statute that prohib-
ited the dumping of solid waste originating outside New Jersey in any
public or private landfill within the state.2 3 The Supreme Court ruled
that the New Jersey statute failed to provide any rationale for discrimi-
nating against out-of-state solid waste while permitting unrestricted
disposal of in-state refuse.24 However, as noted in the introduction of
this Article, the Supreme Court reserved judgment on the question of
whether a state might constitutionally exclude out-of-state waste from
publicly owned landfill sites.2"
B. The Market Participant Doctrine
The Supreme Court has established a complete exemption from dor-
mant Commerce Clause restrictions for governments acting as market
participants rather than as market regulators. The scope of the market
participant doctrine is unclear. Each Supreme Court decision applying
the doctrine is based heavily on the particular facts in that case.
In a decision applying the market participant doctrine to a county
landfill, the Third Circuit in Swin Resources Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County, Pennsylvania observed that the contours of the market partici-
pant doctrine were far from clear:
Application of the distinction between "market participant" and
"market regulator" has, however, occasioned considerable dispute
in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The author of each of the
three opinions that applied the doctrine - Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., (Powell, J.); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, (Blackmun, J.);
White, (Rehnquist, J.) - authored a dissent in the next, the pat-
tern being maintained by Justice Rehnquist's dissent in South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the principal case
in which application of the doctrine resulted in a conclusion that
the state was not a market participant.26
22. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
23. Id. at 628.
24. Id. at 626-27. Cf Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Nat.
Resources, 58 U.S.L.W. 2547 (March 2, 1990) (county may ban the importation of
trash into a private landfall when there is no distinction between out-of-state trash and
the in-state trash of other counties).
25. Id. at 627 n.6.
26. Swin Resources Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted).
1990]
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The Supreme Court first established the market participant excep-
tion in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.2 7 The Court upheld a Mary-
land statute that encouraged licensed scrap processors to rid the state
of abandoned automobiles by paying a bounty for crushed car hulks.28
Virginia scrap processors challenged the statute on the grounds that it
impermissibly burdened commerce by imposing more stringent docu-
mentation requirements on out-of-state processors than on Maryland
businesses.29 The Court concluded that the statute did not unduly bur-
den interstate commerce because Maryland was acting as a market par-
ticipant rather than as a market regulator. "Maryland has not sought
to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to regulate the conditions under which
it may occur. Instead it has entered into the market itself to bid up
their price."'30 The Court concluded that Maryland "as a purchaser, in
effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce" had merely "re-
stricted its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the State.",31
The Court held, "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce
Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." 32
In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,33 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the market
participant doctrine while simultaneously establishing a natural re-
sources exception to that rule. The Court held that a state could give
preference to state residents in the sale of cement manufactured at a
state-owned cement plant without violating the Commerce Clause.34
In 1919, South Dakota built a cement plant to address a regional ce-
ment shortage.35 For many years, the plant produced more cement
than state residents needed and sold the surplus to out-of-state custom-
ers including Reeves, Inc., a Wyoming concrete distributor.36 In 1978,
however, the plant found itself unable to meet the increasing regional
27. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 796-802.
30. Id. at 806.
31. Id. at 805.
32. Id. at 810.
33. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 430, 431 n.1.
36. Id. at 432-33.
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and national demand.37 Accordingly, the plant began enforcing a long
standing policy of giving preference to South Dakota residents.3 8 The
policy forced Reeves, which obtained ninety-five percent of its supply
from the South Dakota plant, to cut production by seventy-six percent,
and Reeves brought suit challenging the plant's preferential policy.39
The Reeves Court found that South Dakota acted as a market par-
ticipant rather than as a market regulator and, therefore, concluded
that the state's policy of preferring its residents was not subject to dor-
mant Commerce Clause restrictions.' The Court reaffirmed the mar-
ket participant doctrine:
The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as
market participants and States as market regulators makes good
sense and sound law. As that case explains, the Commerce Clause
responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures im-
peding free private trade in the national marketplace.... There is
no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the
States themselves to operate freely in the free market.41
In addition, the Court rejected the contention that the preference
policy violated the per se standard used in Philadelphia v. New Jersey:
We find the label "protectionism" of little help in this context.
The States's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is
"protectionist" only in the sense that it limits benefits generated
by a state program to those who fund the state treasury and whom
the State was created to serve. Petitioner's argument apparently
also would characterize as "protectionist" rules restricting to state
residents the enjoyment of state educational institutions, energy
generated by a state-run plant, police and fire protection, and agri-
cultural improvement and business development programs. Such
policies, while perhaps "protectionist" in a loose sense, reflect the
essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of the state govern-
ment - to serve the citizens of the State.42
The Reeves Court, however, stated that the market participant doc-
trine might not be applied in circumstances involving natural re-
sources. The district court in Reeves held that the policy of favoring
South Dakota customers violated the Commerce Clause in part be-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 400.
41. Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 442.
1990]
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cause cement was a natural resource that a state could not hoard.4
The Supreme Court rejected the district court's finding that cement
was a natural resource, but noted that natural resources may be ex-
cluded in some cases from the scope of the market participant doctrine:
This argument, although rooted in the core purpose of the Com-
merce Clause, does not fit the present facts. Cement is not a natu-
ral resource, like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. Cf. Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, supra (landfill sites); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229,
(1911) (same); Note, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 741 (1979). It is the end
product of a complex process whereby a costly physical plant and
human labor act on raw materials. South Dakota has not sought
to limit access to the State's limestone used to make cement. Nor
has it restricted the ability of private firms of sister States to set up
plants within its borders. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Moreover, petitioner
has not suggested that South Dakota possesses unique access to
the materials needed to produce cement. Whatever limits might
exist on a State's ability to invoke the Alexandria Scrap exemption
to hoard resources which by happenstance are found there, those
limits do not apply here.'
Most significantly for this Article, the Reeves Court cited Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, which involves landfill sites, as an example of a natural
resources case; the significance of this citation will be discussed in
depth later in this Article.45
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an executive order of
the Mayor of Boston requiring all construction projects funded in
whole or in part either by city funds or city-administered federal funds
to be performed by a work force at least half of which is composed of
Boston residents.46 The Court concluded that Boston acted as a mar-
ket participant and, therefore, was not subject to the restraints of the
Commerce Clause.47
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,4  a
Supreme Court plurality held that an Alaskan regulation that required
43. Id. at 443-44.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 443, and see infra notes 66, 115-57 and accompanying text.
46. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
47. Id.
48. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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purchasers of state-owned timber to process the timber in Alaska prior
to export violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court ruled
that the Alaska regulation constituted market regulation rather than
market participation because of the conditions it attached to state tim-
ber sales resulted in "downstream regulation of the timber-processing
market in which it [the state] is not a participant."49 The Court re-
jected Alaska's contention that Reeves controlled its decision:
Although the Court in Reeves did strongly endorse the right of a
State to deal with whomever it chooses when it participates in the
market, it did not - and did not purport to - sanction the impo-
sition of any terms that the State might desire. For example, the
Court expressly noted in Reeves that "Commerce Clause scrutiny
may well be more rigorous when a restraint on foreign commerce
is alleged," 447 U.S., at 438, n.9, that a natural resource "like
coal, timber, wild game, or minerals," was not involved, but in-
stead the cement was "the end product of a complex process
whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on raw
materials," id. at 443-444, and that South Dakota did not bar re-
sale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers, id. at 444,
n. 17. In this case, all three of the elements that were not present
in Reeves - foreign commerce, a natural resource, and restrictions
on resale - are present.50
It is noteworthy for the purposes of this Article that the Wunnicke
court drew a distinction between the cement at issue in Reeves and the
natural resource, timber, involved in the subsequent case.
Since the Wunnicke decision in 1984, the Supreme Court has favora-
bly mentioned the market participant doctrine in two cases, without
applying the rule in either case.51 In Wisconsin Department of Indus-
try, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould,52 the Supreme Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted a Wiscon-
sin statute that debarred certain repeat violators of the NLRA from
doing business with the state. The Court rejected Wisconsin's argu-
ment that it acted as a market participant. "We agree with the Court
of Appeals, however, that by flatly prohibiting state purchases from
repeat labor law violators Wisconsin 'simply is not functioning as a
private purchaser of services'; for all practical purposes, Wisconsin's
49. Id. at 99.
50. Id. at 95-96.
51. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
52. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
34 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:25
debarment scheme is tantamount to regulation."53 The Court stated
that the market participant doctrine had no application where Con-
gress had acted and preempted state law. "In any event, the 'market
participant' doctrine reflects the particular concerns underlying the
Commerce Clause, not any general notion regarding the necessary ex-
tent of state power in areas where Congress has acted.",54
In New Energy Co. v. Limbach,55 the Supreme Court held that an
Ohio statute that awarded tax credit for each gallon of ethanol sold as
a component of gasohol by fuel dealers discriminates against interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, but only if the ethanol
is produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages to
ethanol produced in Ohio. The Supreme Court rejected Ohio's conten-
tion that it acted as a market participant:
The market participant doctrine has no application here. The
Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale
of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes - a pri-
meval governmental activity. To be sure, the tax credit scheme
has the purpose and effect of subsidizing a particular industry, as
do many dispositions of the tax laws. That does not transform it
into a form of state participation in the free market.56
III. LANDFILLS AND THE MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
Five federal and state decisions have applied the market participant
doctrine in holding that state, county or municipal landfills may dis-
criminate against or prohibit out-of-state solid waste without violating
the dormant Commerce Clause. 57 These cases have concluded that
landfills are not scarce natural resources but are participants in the
market for disposal services.5" In addition, some of these cases have
emphasized local shortages in landfill capacity as a basis for excluding
out-of-state waste.59
53. Id. at 289 (citations omitted) (quoting the appellate court opinion, 750 F.2d 608
(1984)).
54. Id.
55. 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988).
56. Id. at 1809.
57. See cases cited supra note 7.
58. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys. Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 253-54
(3d Cir. 1989); Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204, 1217-18 (D.R.I. 1987);
Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc., v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 130 (D. Or.
1986), aff'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing local shortages of
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The most recent case, Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming
County," will probably be the most influential because it involved the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Federal district courts decided three
of the previous decisions, one of which was affirmed in a rather cursory
opinion by the Ninth Circuit, and the Maryland Court of Appeals de-
cided the fifth case.6 1 In Swin, the operator of a solid waste processing
facility brought an action against Lycoming County, which operated a
landfill.62 The County charged a lower rate for the reception and dis-
posal of waste from Lycoming and nearby counties than for waste
originating from outside that area.6 3 Swin's waste processing facility
received solid waste from Eastern Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
In a two to one decision, the Swin Court held that the County was a
market participant in operating its landfill and, therefore, exempt from
the dormant Commerce Clause:
We see Lycoming as a market participating in the market for dis-
posal services: the discrimination to which Swin objects is embod-
ied only in rules concerning the price and volume conditions
under which persons may use the disposal service that Lycoming
itself offers. In setting these price and volume conditions, Lycom-
ing has not crossed the line that Alaska crossed when that state
attempted to regulate the timber-processing market by condition-
ing its timber sales on guarantees that the purchasers would act in
a certain way in a downstream market. The price and volume
conditions to which Swin objects do not pertain to the operation
of private landfills and do not apply beyond the immediate market
in which Lycoming transacts business.
If Maryland may decree that only those with Maryland auto
hulks will receive state bounties, it would seem that Lycoming can
similarly decree that only local trash will be disposed of in its
landfill on favorable terms. If South Dakota may give preference
to local concrete buyers when a severe shortage makes that re-
source scarce, it would seem that Lycoming may similarly give
preference to local garbage (and hence local garbage-producing
residents) when a shortage of disposal sites makes landfills scarce.
And if Boston may limit jobs to local residents, we see no reason
why Lycoming may not limit preferential use of its landfill to local
landfill space as a factor in upholding a government landfill's restrictions on the accept-
ance of out-of-state solid waste).
60. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989).
61. See cases cited supra note 7.
62. 883 F.2d at 246-48.
63. Id.
1990]
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garbage (and hence local garbage-producing residents)."
Thus, the Swin Court used the market participant doctrine and the
local shortages of landfill space to uphold the County's discriminatory
pricing policies against a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
In Lefrancois v. Rhode Island,6 5 a federal district court held that
Rhode Island could completely ban the dumping of all out-of-state
solid waste despite the fact that the landfill was the state's only generic-
waste landfill and the largest sanitary landfill in New England. The
court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the landfill constituted a
natural resource outside the market participant doctrine's scope:
The plaintiff correctly notes that in distinguishing a cement
plant from natural resources such as timber, minerals, and wild
game, for which the Commerce Clause requires an unfettered na-
tional market, the Court in Reeves cited City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, and parenthetically, landfill sites, in support. And
plaintiff's position would be strong, indeed, if this Court were to
accept plaintiff's underlying premise that Rhode Island is partici-
pating in the landfill site market. However, I believe that in oper-
ating the Central Landfill, Rhode Island has entered the market
for landfill services and is therefore not a participant in a natural-
resource market. In defining the relevant market as landfill serv-
ices, I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, which addressed this question in the context of a pri-
vate refuse hauler's challenge of out-of-county refuse at a county-
owned landfill. The Court wrote:
The market in which the County participates in the operation
of the Disgah landfill is not waste. The County neither buys nor
sells refuse deposited in its landfill. Rather, it provides a service
to [the plaintiff] and the other private waste haulers, i.e., for a
fee, the County accepts the waste they have collected, compacts
it and covers it with a soil so that its final disposal complies with
all applicable environmental and health laws. Therefore, for
purposes of the market participant analysis in this case, the
market is landfill services.
The distinction between a market in landfill services and landfill
sites is not illusory; the difference is easily discerned by examining
what has been closed to the plaintiff since the amendment of sec-
tion 23-19-13.1. This statutory amendment has deprived the
plaintiff and other out-of-state refuse haulers of their ability to de-
64. Id. at 250.
65. 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987).
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posit waste to be processed in the state-operated Central Landfill.
The amendment has not, however, precluded any party, in-state
or foreign, from purchasing property upon which to construct a
sanitary landfill open to all waste regardless of origin. Indeed, as
the parties have stipulated, four such license applications are cur-
rently pending before the state authorities. In operating the Cen-
tral Landfill, Rhode Island has done nothing more than purchase
a natural resource, i.e., the landfill site, and offer to its customers
the service of waste processing. 66
The Swin court presented additional arguments for not applying the
natural resources exception to landfills.67 This Article will examine
those arguments in the course of presenting its analysis of the natural
resources exception to the market participant doctrine.
IV. CRITICISM OF THE MARKET PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE AS
APPLIED TO LANDFILLS.
Judge Gibbons, in his dissenting opinion in Swin, argued that the
distinction between a state's role as a market participant versus as a
market regulator was no longer valid, and contended that the dormant
Commerce Clause barred states or local governments from discrimi-
nating against the importation of out-of-state solid waste.68 In addi-
tion, Kovacs and Anderson claim that some states attempt to evade the
Commerce Clause by using their regulatory powers to drive out private
landfill operators who may discriminate against out-of-state solid
waste, gaining governmental monopoly control of landfills in order to
block the importation of out-of-state solid waste.69 Although Judge
Gibbons and Kovacs and Anderson make a number of valid points the
Supreme Court is unlikely to adopt the arguments of either.
A. Judge Gibbons
Judge Gibbons argued that the market participant doctrine was no
longer good law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transportation Authority,7 ° which overruled
National League of Cities v. Usery.7 1 Judge Gibbons first pointed out
66. Id. at 1211 (citations omitted).
67. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
68. Swin, 883 F.2d at 257-62.
69. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810.
70. 469 U.S. 528 (1984).
71. 426 U.S. 883 (1976).
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that the market participant doctrine was closely linked to the reasoning
in National League of Cities:
Thirteen years ago in a peculiar eruption of Dixieism, the
Supreme Court announced that the dormant Commerce Clause
(unexercised by Congress) did not reach local government's "non-
governmental" participation in the market. Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976).
On the same day the Supreme Court, manifesting the same dis-
ease, also declared that the Commerce Clause granted Congress
no power to regulate local governments' "governmental" func-
tions. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct.
2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). Garcia has since expressly dis-
pensed with the doctrine of National League of Cities, 469 U.S.
531, 105 S. Ct. at 1007. In so doing, it also effectively eliminated
the Dixiecrat basis for Alexandria Scrap, its progeny, and the mar-
ket participant exception.72
Judge Gibbons stated that the National League of Cities distinction
between "integral" or "traditional governmental" functions versus
"non-integral" activities followed the same rationale as the distinction
between market participation and market regulation, and, therefore,
that Garcia effectively overruled the market participant doctrine:
Rejection of the market participant theory necessarily follows
from Garcia on each of that case's main premises. First, the regu-
latory/government distinction is nothing more than the inte-
gral/non-integral distinction in another guise. To be sure, the
distinction played divergent roles depending upon whether Con-
gress had acted. Under National League of Cities, the label of "in-
tegral" or "governmental" protected a state activity from the
Commerce Clause; under Alexandria Scrap, the label "regulatory"
or "governmental" left a state activity open to (dormant) Com-
merce Clause attack. The different uses of the categories, how-
ever, changes neither their similarity nor their invalidity. Garcia
noted at length the inherent unworkability of such labeling. In-
deed, in other contexts, courts have concluded exactly what the
cases cited by the majority deny, that the operation of a landfill is
an integral, traditional governmental activity. See Hybud Equip-
ment Corp., 654 F.2d at 1196 (deeming landfill operation a tradi-
tional governmental activity); Hancock, 619 F. Supp. 322, 328
(E.D.Pa.) (stating, without deciding, that counties "simply regu-
lat[e]" landfills), 811 F.2d 225, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
county operation of landfill "state action" for antitrust
72. Swin, 883 F.2d at 257 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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purposes)., 3
The Swin majority rejected Judge Gibbons' argument that Garcia
had effectively overruled the market participant doctrine, and noted
the distinction between Congress' positive power to regulate interstate
commerce, at issue in Garcia, and the dormant Commerce Clause's
market participant doctrine:
That Congress has a (virtually) absolute authority to enact legisla-
tion affecting the operation of state governments, as Garcia held,
does not, however, imply that the federal courts should hold un-
constitutional as falling within the market participant doctrine.
Garcia permits Congress to require state-operated landfills to ac-
cept out-of-state garbage or to overturn the market participant
doctrine in its entirety. Garcia does not require the Courts of Ap-
peals to do so absent Congressional action.74
The Swin majority went on to state that even if they agreed with Judge
Gibbons "that Garcia undermined the logical basis for the market par-
ticipant doctrine cases, we lack the authority to overrule them."75
Since Garcia, only two Supreme Court cases, New Energy and
Gould, have discussed the market participant doctrine to any degree,
but neither applied it.76 As previously noted," the Gould court held
that the NLRA preempted a Wisconsin statute and, therefore, that the
market participant doctrine did not apply where Congress had acted
and preempted state law. In New Energy,78 the Supreme court held
that the market participant doctrine did not apply to an Ohio tax credit
scheme designed to promote ethanol use that discriminated against eth-
anol from states that did not have reciprocal tax advantages for Ohio
ethanol; the Court concluded that Ohio's attempt to influence the etha-
nol market through tax credits was far different from the state partici-
pating in the market through sales or purchases.
Neither New Energy nor Gould provide much insight into whether
the Supreme Court is likely to reconsider the market participant doc-
trine in light of the Garcia decision. Although the tax credit scheme in
New Energy in some ways resembles the bounty for auto hulks in Alex-
andria Scrap, the two statutes create distinguishable situations. The
73. Id. at 260-61.
74. Swin, 883 F.2d at 255.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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Maryland statute from Alexandria Scrap made that state in effect the
private purchaser of abandoned cars. In contrast, the Ohio tax credit
program subsidized the ethanol industry, albeit in a manner in which
Ohio acted more as a friendly regulator of energy industry than as a
direct participant in the market.7 9 In Gould, the issue of NLRA pre-
emption clouded the question of whether Wisconsin's refusal to
purchase from repeat NLRA violators placed the state within the
scope of the market participant doctrine.80 The facts in New Energy
and Gould were different enough from Alexandria Scrap, Reeves or
White to make it difficult to say whether the Supreme Court is intent
on overruling or narrowing the market participant doctrine. It is
worth noting, however, that six current Justices have joined at least
one majority opinion upholding the doctrine.81
Judge Gibbons makes a valid point when he argues that the distinc-
tion between the state as market participant and as market regulator is
artificial in much the same way as the integral/non-integral govern-
ment function distinction overturned by Garcia.8" The Swin majority,
however, correctly observed that Garcia involved the positive power of
Congress to regulate state governments, and, accordingly, did not nec-
essarily overrule Supreme Court cases involving the market participant
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.83 A major question is
how far the Supreme court is likely to extend its analysis in Garcia in
the context of the dormant Commerce Clause. Garcia was a five to
four decision, and President Bush will probably replace one or more of
the Justices who voted with the majority with a more conservative Jus-
tice. Therefore, it would be unwise to bet that the Supreme Court will
expand Garcia to overturn the market participant doctrine in the near
future. Moreover, it is quite possible that a new Bush Supreme Court
79. Compare New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988) with Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
80. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
81. Comment, supra note 1, at 1320 and n.60. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
O'Connor, Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Rhite; see supra notes 46-47
and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun supported the doctrine in Reeves; see supra
notes 40-45 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia recognized the validity of the doc-
trine in New Energy, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy has
never addressed the market participant issue. Justice White has continuously dissented
from applications of the doctrine.
82. Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 257-62 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting).
83. Id.
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might overrule Garcia.84
B. Market Participants or Market Destroyers?
In their article, Kovacs and Anderson argue that at least some states
use their regulatory powers to drive out private landfills and insure
governmental control of the landfill industry. 85 They suggest that
states harass private landfills to prevent the importation of out-of-state
solid waste, which private landfills cannot bar.86 They contend that
courts should not apply the market participant doctrine where states
use their regulatory powers to drive out private market competitors.87
There is some evidence to support Kovacs and Anderson's argu-
ments. State and local governments own or operate approximately
eighty-one percent of the solid waste landfills in the country. 88 As a
result of increasingly stringent regulations and rising costs, an esti-
mated 14,000 solid waste landfills closed between 1978 and 1988.9
Although 5,500 solid waste landfills operated in 1988, processing about
187 million tons annually, one study predicts that in 2013 only 1,003 of
these landfills will be operating, with a total processing capacity of
nineteen million tons.90
On the other hand, private interests own and operate nineteen per-
cent of the nation's landfills.91 That figure is low, but it indicates that
in some states private operators can survive despite heavy government
regulation. In Lefrancois v. Rhode Island,9  where the state operated
the only general purpose landfill in Rhode Island and the largest in
New England, the federal district court rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion that the state occupied a monopoly position because four license
applications for private landfills were pending.93
84. Current Chief Justice Rehnquist pointedly predicted in his Garcia dissent that
in the future a majority of the Court would overrule that case. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. at 528, 580 (1984) (Renquist, J. dissenting).
85. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 779-816.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
89. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 781; see generally Beck, supra note 1, at
67-76 (discussing the growing shortage of landfill space).
90. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 781-82.
91. See supra note 6 (if 81% of landfills are government owned then 19% must be
privately owned).
92. 669 F. Supp. at 1206, 1211-12.
93. Id. at 1212.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
42 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 38:25
It may be difficult in some cases to distinguish between government
regulations designed to protect the environment and those intended to
drive out private landfills. For example, Kovacs and Anderson con-
tend that "North Carolina has established water discharge limits so
stringent that a planned facility could not operate economically."94
Assuming that Kovacs and Anderson are correct that a private opera-
tor could not run a landfill in North Carolina, the issue becomes
whether courts should refuse to apply the market participant exception
where an apparently neutral environmental regulation or statute has
the practical effect of excluding all but government-subsidized landfills.
The fact that a government business occupies a monopoly position in a
particular market does not exempt it from the market participant
doctrine.
In Reeves, South Dakota built the cement plant at issue because no
cement plant was then operating in the state. The Supreme Court ap-
plied the market participant doctrine despite the fact that the plaintiff,
Reeves, was unable to find another supplier." Thus, it is unlikely that
courts will refuse to apply the market participant doctrine merely be-
cause strict government regulations make it difficult or impossible for
private competitors to enter a market, unless the regulations are dis-
criminatory. States and local governments clearly have a strong inter-
est in protecting the environment and in public safety. Few courts
would hold that legislators designed the North Carolina water dis-
charge limits or similar neutral environmental regulations to drive out
private landfill operators and to guarantee government control of
landfills.
9 6
Kovacs and Anderson have a point when they argue that environ-
mental regulations may drive out private landfills and leave govern-
ment subsidized landfills in a monopoly position.9 7 Reeves casts
doubts, however, on the proposition that a monopoly position is
enough to deprive that business of the protection of the market partici-
94. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810.
95. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 128-59 and accompanying text.
97. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 815-16. See generally supra notes 85-96
and accompanying text for evidence that the decline in the number of landfills in the
United States is the result of increasingly strict environmental regulations that drive up
costs for private landfill operators. Of course, a good argument is that strict environ-
mental controls are necessary to protect the public health, and that the landfill crisis
should be addressed through more recycling and changes in the American lifestyle. See
generally Beck, supra note 1, at 67-76.
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pant doctrine.98 Nor would the mere existence of neutral environmen-
tal regulations that have the incidental effect of limiting private
landfills lead courts exclude landfills from the market participant doc-
trine.99 Kovacs and Anderson have identified a serious problem: the
ditfculties faced by private landfills in competing with government
landfills. However, they do not provide legal arguments which will
convince the Supreme Court.
V. THE NATURAL RESOURCES EXCEPTION
An exception to the market participant doctrine exists in the case of
natural resources." The courts that have applied the market partici-
pant doctrine to landfills have argued that landfills are services rather
than natural resources.10 1 On the other hand, Kovacs and Anderson
contend that landfills are clearly within the natural resources excep-
tion."0 2 This Article contends that landfills are a hybrid or mixture of
natural resources, primarily land, and services. Courts should weigh
the national importance of a "mixed" natural resource/service in de-
termining whether to apply the market participant doctrine.
In particular, the national importance of a "mixed" natural re-
source/service should be a factor when courts balance the local need
for landfills against the national or regional agenda. Courts that have
permitted landfills to discriminate against out-of-state solid waste often
emphasize local shortages of landfill space. 0 3 Courts should not weigh
"artificial" shortages created by NIMBY politics in assessing local
needs versus national interstate commerce concerns.
A. Natural Resources and the Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has distinguished between goods produced by
nature with little or no investment by society, and goods requiring a
significant human investment either in their production or consump-
tion." 4 Before 1900, the Supreme Court followed the common law
98. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 43-45, 50, 66-67 and accompanying text, and infra notes 101-
59 and accompanying text.
101. See cases cited supra note 7; see also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text;
infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
102. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810-11.
103. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
104. Comment, supra note 1, at 1330-31 (arguing that courts have been more will-
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doctrine that raw natural resources such as wild game belonged to the
state as the trustee for present and future inhabitants.° 5 Beginning in
the early 1900's, however, the Court in a series of cases held that the
Commerce Clause prohibits states from hoarding natural resources
such as natural gas or coal."°6 In 1979, the Court in Hughes v.
Oklahoma 107 swept away the last vestiges of the old common law rule
that states own fish and game when it held that Oklahoma's attempt to
restrict minnow exports violated the dormant Commerce Clause.
Some commentators, however, have argued that the Supreme Court
has and should take a different approach where a state expends signifi-
cant funds to preserve natural resources.10 8  In Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Commission,"co the Supreme Court upheld a Montana law that
discriminated against nonresidents in granting permits to hunt elk after
finding that the state had invested considerable effort to preserve the
elk population. Baldwin, decided one year before Hughes, involved the
privileges and immunities clause but it may have significant implica-
tions for Commerce Clause purposes. It is also noteworthy that the
Court in Baldwin found that elk hunting "is not a means to the nonres-
ident's livelihood" whereas the Hughes case involved a commercial
minnow business." 0 Thus, two factors that may influence the Supreme
ing to allow a state to favor its citizens where the state has invested resources to pre-
serve the natural resource in question); see also infra notes 105-59 and accompanying
text.
105. See, eg., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896) (noting that the
"'ownership of wild animals ... is in the State ... in its sovereign capacity as the
representative and for the benefit of all its people in common'" (quoting State v. Rod-
man, 58 Minn. 393, 400, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099 (1894))); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391, 394 (1876) (stating that each state owns the tidewaters within its jurisdiction and
the fish they contain); Comment, supra note 1, at 1329 and n. 114.
106. See, eg., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 595-600 (1923) (strik-
ing down a West Virginia statute giving preference to domestic consumers of natural
gas over out-of-state users); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255-62
(1911) (finding unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute prohibiting foreign corporations
from transporting natural gas out of the state; the Court noted that if it upheld the
statute then "Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals"); Comment, supra note 1, at 1329 and nn.l 15-16.
107. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
108. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, the Commerce Clause,
and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 89; Comment, supra
note 1, at 1330-31 (arguing that if a state expends monies to preserve natural resources
then it should be able to give preference to its citizens in using that resource).
109. 436 U.S. 371 (1978). See Comment, supra note 1, at 1330 and nn.118-19 (dis-
cussing Baldwin).
110. Compare Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) with Hughes, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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Court's approach to Commerce Clause cases are: first, whether the
state has invested significant funds to preserve a natural resource, and,
second, the degree to which a state regulation interferes with interstate
commerce. I I I
As discussed in Part II. B. of this Article, the Court in Reeves cre-
ated a natural resources exception to the market participant doc-
trine." 2 The Court held that cement was not a natural resource
because it "is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly
physical plant and human labor act on raw materials."" ' 3 In essence,
the Reeves Court distinguished between natural resources and services
or manufactured products based on whether the goods remained fun-
damentally the same as it existed in nature or was the product of com-
plex human intervention.' 14 Most significantly for the purposes of this
Article, the Reeves Court listed landfill sites in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey"'5 and other cases as examples of natural resources. 116 The
Reeves Court did not explain why it listed landfill site cases among the
natural resources cases, and its reasoning has engendered considerable
controversy. 117
B. Landfills Are Not Natural Resources
The five cases that have applied the market participant exception to
landfills have concluded that such sites are basically service industries
rather than natural resources.'" These cases emphasized that more
than land is involved in the sanitary disposal of solid waste; a site may
compact waste, bury it and employ various methods to preserve the
environment from the escape of the waste." 9 It is clear that a state or
county must expend resources to operate a landfill.12
0
The five courts distinguished the Reeves Court's reference to Phila-
111. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text; infra notes 112-59 and accom-
panying text.
112. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
113. Reeves, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980).
114. Id.
115. See supra note 22.
116. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 443; supra note 44 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; infra notes 118-59 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See supra notes 64, 66 and accompanying text; cases cited supra note 7.
119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
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delphia and landfill sites. They emphasized that Philadelphia involved
a statute that severely limited the access of out-of-state waste haulers to
both private and public landfills.121 Thus, the New Jersey statute re-
stricted the ability of out-of-state waste haulers to purchase land within
the state for landfill resources, and, accordingly, affected the interstate
market in the natural resource of land.122 The refusal of a government
landfill to accept out-of-state waste, however, does not prevent an out-
of-state waste hauler from purchasing land to build a private landfill.' 23
In addition, these courts argued that landfills operating at public ex-
pense may refuse out-of-state waste, especially when there are
shortages of land to handle local waste.' 24 The Swin majority argued
that courts should be able to consider local opposition to landfills in
addressing whether a local shortage of landfill space justifies restric-
tions on the importation of out-of-state waste:
We also take cognizance of the difficulties often attendant in ef-
forts by municipalities to build waste disposal sites in light of their
unpopularity with local residents. Neither the sacrifice of local
residents in allowing a landfill to be built nearby nor the political
character of much of the shortage of land available for landfill
construction should be ignored.'
121. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Met-
ropolitan Serv. Auth., 643 F. Supp. 127, 131-32 (D.R.I. 1987); County Comm'rs v.
Stevens, 299 Md. 203, 219-21, 473 A.2d 20-21 (1984); Shayne Bros., Inc. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1125, 1132-34 (D.D.C. 1984) (distinguishing Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), which invalidated a New Jersey statute barring out-of-
state solid waste from both private and public landfills from instances in which a public
landfill prohibits out-of-state waste).
122. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for cases arguing that a total ban on
the importation of out-of-state waste by both public and private landfills is impermissi-
ble under Philadelphia and the dormant Commerce Clause. The ban is unconstitutional
because such a limitation prevents out-of-state haulers from purchasing land, a natural
resource, while restrictions on the importation of waste from out-of-state sources by a
government landfill does not prevent an out-of-state waste hauler from purchasing land
to develop private landfills. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
123. Theoretically, out-of-state waste haulers can purchase land for a private land-
fill; however, Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810, argue that states through
various regulatory devices can effectively ban private landfills. See supra notes 85-99
and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent private interests may operate a
landfill.
124. Swin v. Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251-55 (3d Cir.
1989) (arguing that government landfills should be able to favor their citizens because
local citizens provide funding, and especially if there are local landfill shortages); supra
notes 59, 103 and accompanying text.
125. Swin, 883 F.2d at 254.
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This Article proposes that considering local opposition to the impor-
tation of out-of-state waste conflicts with the purpose of the Commerce
Clause.
C. Landfills Are Natural Resources
Both Judges Gibbons and Kovacs and Anderson argue that landfills
essentially sell land, a natural resource, rather than provide services.
Kovacs and Anderson emphasize that there is limited land available
and suitable for landfill use in an era of intense government regulation
of the environment. 126 Judge Gibbons argued, "Lycoming County
does not participate in a market 'for disposal services.' Rather, like
any other landfill, it sells space to concerns that have earlier transacted
to purchase and process solid waste."' 127 The arguments, however, do
not satisfactorily address the issue that state or local governments do
provide at least some money to operate landfills.
VI. "MIXED" LANDFILLS
Landfills involve a mixture of natural resources, land, and services
designed to safely dispose of the solid waste. 128 In a mixed natural
resources/service case, courts should balance the nation's interest in
the free exchange of natural resources against the extent to which local
governments have expended monies to preserve that natural resource.
Under some circumstances, a state or local landfill may justifiably favor
local waste over out-of-state waste if a genuine shortage of landfill
space exists. A court, however, should not consider local shortages
that are the result of deliberate attempts to exclude interstate waste.
The Supreme Court is likely to address "mixed" natural re-
sources/government investment cases as it did in Sporhase v. Ne-
braska.'29 In Sporhase, a Colorado resident challenged a Nebraska
statute that restricted the withdrawal of groundwater from Nebraska
wells for use in another state unless that state had a reciprocity agree-
ment with Nebraska. 130 The Court first concluded that groundwater is
126. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810-12.
127. Swin, 883 F.2d at 259 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
128. See infra notes 129-59 and accompanying text; supra notes 117-27 and accom-
panying text for various arguments that landfills are either natural resources or service
industries; if good arguments can be made on either side of that argument then it is
reasonable to suggest that landfills are both natural resources and service industries.
129. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
130. Id. at 943-44.
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an article of commerce and, therefore, subject to the Commerce
Clause.131 The Court agreed with Nebraska that the state had a strong
interest in conserving groundwater in times of "severe shortage."' 132
The Court emphasized that Nebraska had greater authority to regulate
water use than other economic goods because water carries health
implications:
First, a State's power to regulate the use of water in times and
places of shortage for the purpose of protecting the health of its
citizens - and not simply the health of its economy - is at the
core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have
long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on
the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other.' 33
Furthermore, the Court recognized that a state might favor its citizens
in the time of shortage where the state had expended funds to conserve
a natural resource: "Finally, given appellee's conservation efforts, the
continuing availability of ground water in Nebraska is simply happen-
stance; the natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly pro-
duced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times
of shortage." 134 The Court cited Reeves, Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
and Baldwin for this quotation, although the first case was given the
"See" signal, and the last two cases merely warranted a "Ctf.
1 35
While the Sporhase Court indicated that a state might be able to
favor its citizens in times of shortage where the state had actively en-
couraged conservation measures, the Court concluded that the reci-
procity provisions in the Nebraska statute did not sufficiently promote
conservation, and, therefore, violated the Commerce Clause: "The rec-
iprocity requirement fails to clear this initial hurdle. For there is no
evidence that this restriction is narrowly tailored to the conservation
and preservation rationale."1 36
The Supreme Court's decision in Sporhase offers several clues as to
how the Court should deal with efforts by government landfills to ex-
clude out-of-state waste. If a county or state can show that health or
environmental concerns impose significant limits on landfill space, then
a government landfill should be able to favor its own citizens. Kovacs
131. Id. at 945-54.
132. Id. at 956.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 957.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 957-58.
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and Anderson fail to distinguish between government regulations limit-
ing landfill space that serve a genuine health or environmental purpose
and those that simply reflect mere parochialism.137 For instance, if a
county can demonstrate that the presence of a large aquifer requires
severe limitations on landfill use in that area then a court is likely to
allow discrimination against waste from beyond that county.13 1
On the other hand, a blanket restriction on disposal of out-of-state
waste that is unrelated to health or environmental concerns, like the
reciprocity requirement in Sporhase, fails to meet the dictates of the
dormant Commerce Clause. This Article strongly disagrees with the
Swin Court that shortages caused by local opposition to landfills is the
type of genuine shortage that warrants restrictions on interstate
commerce.
The Swin Court argued that landfills do not constitute natural re-
sources because the shortage of land for such purposes is often related
to political factors rather than the "happenstance" of whether one state
is endowed by nature with more suitable land than another site:
Shortages of land available for landfill construction may be cre-
ated by vigorous local opposition to using geologically suitable
land to build landfills or by a state's hesitation, in light of the fi-
nancial cost, to build landfills on geologically suitable land that it
has already permitted to be dedicated to residential, commercial,
industrial, or recreational use. To the extent that a shortage of
landfill-available land is caused by such political factors, charac-
terizing landfill-available land as being in short supply (and hence
distinguishable from land available for cement plants) would seem
inconsistent with a "happenstance" rationale for the natural re-
sources exception to the market participant doctrine, as past and
present political choices are not the product of geological
happenstance. '39
The Swin court dontended that courts should consider that landfills are
usually built despite local opposition. 1"
137. See generally Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 779-816 (complaining
that environmental regulations raise costs for private landfill operators, but failing to
address the issue of whether the benefits of those regulations in promoting public health
outweigh the costs to private landfills).
138. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. at 956-57 (the Supreme Court is more likely to
uphold statutes or regulations favoring a particular group of citizens if such a law pro-
motes public health rather than simply advances economic protectionism).
139. Swin Resource Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 253-54 (3d Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 254. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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The Swin court cited the Sporhase decision several times, but failed
to note that the Sporhase case involved conservation efforts intended to
promote public health, a valid exercise of the state's police power.1 41
The Swin Court argued that government landfills may discriminate
against out-of-state waste because local political forces oppose using
suitable land for landfill purposes. This argument is flawed because
parochialism is not a valid reason for a state exercising its police pow-
ers to favor local waste. The Sporhase Court emphasized that the
Supreme Court is less likely to invalidate a statute designed to promote
public health than one that simply is economically beneficial to local
residents.142
In Geo-Tech Reclamation Industries v. Hamrick, 43 the Fourth Cir-
cuit recently struck down a West Virginia statute that allowed a state
agency to deny a solid waste facility permit on the basis of adverse
public sentiment. The Geo-Tech court held that the statute provided
no meaningful standards for permit approval, and that there was no
rational relationship between the statute's goals and its means.'" The
court concluded that the clause authorizing the director of the West
Virginia Department of Natural Resources to reject permits that were
"significantly adverse to the public interest" bore no substantial or ra-
tional relationship to the state's interest in promoting the general pub-
lic welfare and, therefore, was outside the scope of the police power.145
Accordingly, pursuant to the analysis in Sporhase, courts should not
defer to a government landfill's restrictions on out-of-state waste if the
landfill shortage is the result of parochialism, a goal outside the scope
of the police power. The fact that local citizens oppose waste from out-
of-state sources does not constitute a valid health or environmental
concern that might allow a state or its subdivision to favor its citizens
in a time of shortage. 146
141. Compare Swin, 883 F.2d at 254-54 (discussing Sporhase, but failing to mention
that the Nebraska statute at issue promoted public health) with Sporhase, 458 U.S. at
956-57 (distinguishing between statutes promoting public health versus those advancing
economic protectionism for purposes of the Commerce Clause).
142. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143. 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989).
144. Id. at 665-67.
145. Id. at 666. West Virginia recognized "that many who speak out against a land-
fill will do so because of self-interest, bias or ignorance. These are but a few of the less-
than-noble motivations commonly referred to as the 'Not-in-My-Backyard' syndrome."
Id.
146. The Supreme Court in Sporhase distinguished between laws promoting public
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The Swin Court's argument that courts should consider local opposi-
tion to landfills conflicts with the purpose and history of the Commerce
Clause, which is designed to promote national economic unity and to
prevent local protectionism.1 4 7  A government landfill surely may
charge an out-of-state waste hauler a fee reflecting the full cost of dis-
posing of the waste and subsidize the cost for local citizens. 148 The
dormant Commerce Clause demands, however, that government land-
fills provide equal access to both local and out-of-state waste unless
there is a genuine shortage of landfill space caused by health or envi-
ronmental concerns that falls within the legitimate scope of the police
power. 149
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether government landfills fit within the market par-
ticipant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause or the natural re-
health and those based on economic protectionism. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956-57;
supra note 138 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text; Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REV. 1091 (1986); Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
Htitv. L. REv. 1335 (1934) (dormant Commerce Clause designed to prevent local pro-
tectionism and promote national economic unity); see also Comment, supra note 1, at
1313-17 (discussing purpose of dormant Commerce Clause).
148. A state owned enterprise can certainly charge a fee reflecting market cost; for
example, the cement plant in Reeves sold its cement like any private cement plant
would. Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 430-33 (1980). The question of whether a
state may subsidize the cost for local citizens is more complex. In Alexandria Scrap, the
Supreme Court upheld a scheme that only those with Maryland auto hulks would re-
ceive that state's bounties. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 796-810
(1976). The Swin Court argued that Alexandria Scrap supported the Third Circuit's
holding that a government landfill may exclude out-of-state waste. Swin Resource Sys.
v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 250 (3d Cir. 1989). A basic difference between
Alexandria Scrap and Swin, however, is that landfills involve land, a natural resource.
Thus, a state might be able to favor its citizens where a natural resource is not involved,
but may be precluded from exercising a similar preference in regard to scarce natural
resources. In the case of landfills it is perhaps less important that a government landfill
charges a below market rate for local waste than whether it excludes out-of-state waste
or charges above market rates designed to keep out such waste. During genuine local
shortages of solid waste landfill space it may be appropriate for a landfill owned by a
government entity to favor its citizens by charging a lower price as long as the price for
out-of-state waste bears a reasonable relationship to the extent of that shortage. See
supra notes 100-47 and accompanying text, and infra notes 149-59 and accompanying
text.
149. See supra notes 100-48 and accompanying text, and infra notes 150-59 and
accompanying text.
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sources doctrine is a difficult one because landfills involve important
natural resources, suitable land, and public expenditures for the serv-
ices necessary to run an environmentally safe operation. The Supreme
Court's decision in Sporhase suggests that a government may favor its
citizens where the polity makes expenditures to conserve a scarce re-
source in a time of genuine shortage.150 Neither the courts that have
applied the market participant exception to landfills nor Judge Gibbons
or Kovacs and Anderson have distinguished between genuine and arti-
ficial shortages.' 51 Sporhase implies that a government's efforts to con-
serve a natural resource during a genuine shortage may override the
national interest in free trade. Conversely, one may infer from
Sporhase that government goals outside the proper scope of the police
power are insufficient to trump the Commerce Clause's national eco-
nomic policy.' 52 Thus, Sporhase in effect applied a balancing test that
weighed the national economic goal of encouraging free trade in natu-
ral resources against the value of promoting local conservation of genu-
inely scarce natural resources.'5 3
Courts applying the dormant Commerce Clause to cases involving
government landfills, must balance the value of encouraging local com-
munities to set aside land and resources for landfills by permitting local
authorities to favor their citizens with the need to promote regional
and national solutions to the solid waste crisis. Some communities or
150. See supra notes 129-49 and accompanying text.
151. Courts that applied the market participant doctrine to landfills invoke local
shortages of landfill space as an additional ground for excluding out-of-state waste, but
fail to address whether the local shortage is the result of local prejudices or a genuine
shortage of environmentally suitable land. See supra notes 59, 139-40 and accompany-
ing text. The Third Circuit in Swin argued that courts ought to consider local pressures
against the siting of landfills, and in effect that such politically created shortages are
genuine shortages. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. Courts should dis-
tinguish between "artificial" and "genuine" shortages. See supra notes 129-50 and ac-
companying text, and infra notes 152-59 and accompanying text. Kovacs and
Anderson note that some areas have less land suitable for landfills than other regions
but do not address whether a genuine shortage of land would justify favoring local
citizens. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note I, at 810-12. Judge Gibbons in his Swin
dissent condemns the discriminatory price structure in that case, but fails to examine
whether a price differential might be justified as a result of a shortage. Swin Resources
Sys. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d at 261-62 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see supra note
148 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 129-46 and accompanying text.
153. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 956-57 (1982) (applying a different test
under the Commerce Clause depending on whether the public health or economic pro-
tectionism is at issue).
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states have a great deal of land environmentally suitable for landfill use
while other states do not.154 A community blessed with a considerable
amount of landfill resources should not be able to arbitrarily exclude all
out-of-state waste; on the other hand, some incentives must exist to
encourage that community to spend money to operate a government
landfill. 55 Accordingly, a government landfill should not be able to
exclude out-of-state waste unless there is a genuine shortage of land,
but should be able to subsidize local waste costs as long as the landfill
charges a fair market price for waste from outside areas.1 56 It is true
that such a policy would favor local interests over national ones to
some extent. In the long run, however, as the Sporhase Court recog-
nized in the context of groundwater, allowing local governments to
promote a scarce natural resource, in this case landfill space, can work
in the national interest.157
Congress needs to enact legislation that comprehensively addresses
the national problem of solid waste disposal. 158 Americans need to
154. Kovacs and Anderson, supra note 1, at 810-12.
155. The Swin Court correctly pointed out that local opposition often creates barri-
ers to landfills; Swin, 883 F.2d at 253-54; however, while it may be practical to allow
some government subsidies for local waste to encourage the operation of local govern-
mental landfills, the Commerce Clause does not permit restrictions on the importation
of out-of-state waste unless there is a genuine shortage of land for that purpose. See
supra notes 129-54 and accompanying text.
156. States should limit subsidies for local waste in order to prevent exclusion of
out-of-state waste unless a genuine shortage of land suitable for landfills in a particular
community exists. See supra notes 129-55 and accompanying text.
157. Subsidies for local waste should necessarily encourage local communities to
operate community landfills for both local and out-of-state solid waste. It is better to
have subsidies for local waste than to have communities refuse to operate landfills at all.
Therefore, in the context of a mixed natural resource/service, courts should exercise
some flexibility and balance local and national interests. On the other hand, any cost
differential between local and out-of-state waste should not be so large that it results in
an effective ban on out-of-state waste. Some accommodation should be made to local
communities that bear the costs of operating a landfill, especially if there is genuine
shortage of landfill space. The Commerce Clause's primary goal of promoting national
free trade must remain paramount, however. See supra notes 100-56 and accompanying
text.
158. Congress addressed the problem of hazardous waste through the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
Philadelphia v. New Jersey held that RCRA did not preempt state regulation of solid
waste, including import restrictions, as a secondary holding. Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 620 n.4 (1978); see also Comment, supra note 1, at 1346 n.214. A
student comment has argued that courts should defer to restrictions placed on out-of-
state waste by government landfills until Congress enacts positive legislation, and that
courts in general should employ the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down only
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produce less waste and to recycle more of it.15 9 Until Congress acts or
the solid waste crisis disappears, federal courts must imaginatively ap-
ply the dormant Commerce Clause to achieve the twin goals of encour-
aging local communities to fund landfills and to promote interstate
commerce in solid waste.
state laws that threaten the health of the national political process. See Comment, supra
note 1, at 1309-49. Although the student comment makes a number of clever argu-
ments, a long line of Supreme Court decisions have used the dormant Commerce Clause
to strike down laws that interfere with the goal of a national free trade market. See
supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text; see, eg., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (an early Supreme Court decision applying the dormant
Commerce Clause in its present form). This Article seeks to predict what the Supreme
Court may hold when confronted with the landfill issue. Nonetheless, only Congress,
not the courts, can fashion a comprehensive solution to the solid waste crisis afflicting
this nation. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. The United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency has proposed some preliminary regulations for solid waste
facilities, but these do not address the crucial issue of restrictions on out-of-state waste.
See FPA Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314 (1988) (to be codi-
fied, at 40 C.F.R. §§ 257, 258) (proposed Aug. 30, 1988); Comment, supra note 1, at
1347-48.
159. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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